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Abstract: 
This paper examines the metamorphosis of Nigeria’s foreign policy from its traditional posture of a responsible 
nation in the international community, to a reckless player under the military between 1993 and 1999. Nigeria’s 
reputation as a respectable state diminished under the Abacha regime, whose tyranny led to multiple violations 
of human rights and breaches of international moral and legal codes. This infamous posture eroded Nigeria’s 
track record of provision of regional and global leadership. Its mineral and oil wealth had naturally imposed 
extra burdens of leadership in the continent of Africa and the world. The paper critically appraises this 
significant transition and departure from traditional foreign policy posture and international image during the 
Abacha era; and using the decision-making model of analysis, it discovers that with the Abacha intervention, a 
new chapter of domestic travails (anti-democracy activities, state-sponsored terrorism, poor human rights 
records, large-scale corruption and financial crimes, and the creation of artificial insulation against the world), 
coupled with an unorthodox manner of dealing with the international community commenced, which clouded 
the good image of the past.  Nigeria thus got alienated in the global system. This paper identifies the pacifist role 
of the successive Abubakar regime, but submits that despite that approach, the grey areas such as the sudden 
death of Chief MKO Abiola (winner of the June 12 presidential elections) in his (Abubakar’s custody), did not 
allow for a complete restoration of Nigeria’s golden era of internationalism. Both regimes had thus bequeathed 
to the nation an unorthodox foreign policy and an unusual image, a development that compels a curious enquiry. 
The paper adopts a theoretical approach and relies exclusively on secondary data for analysis.  
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Introduction 
On November 17, 1993 when General Sani 
Abacha took over from the Interim National 
Government led by Chief Ernest Sonekan, 
he took a number of measures that were 
clearly antediluvian in an age of globalized 
democracy. His dissolution of democratic 
structures and institutions, adoption of full 
martial laws and assumption of sweeping 
powers, massive arrests and detention of 
political opposition, clampdown on the 
press and hunting of the winner of the June 
12 election after the latter’s Epetedo (Lagos) 
Declaration as President, demonstrated a 
clear disinterest in resolving the 1993 
presidential election crises or stabilizing an 
already pulverized polity. The Abacha 
administration itself was not only a child of 
circumstance, but was also the main 
beneficiary of Nigeria’s protracted political 
logjam following the annulment of the 
popularly acclaimed free and fair 
presidential elections that had produced 
Chief Abiola as the winner. This crisis,  
 
coupled with Abacha’s anti-democratic 
posture from the start opened the floodgate 
of problems for Nigeria’s image abroad and 
undermined its respect in the international 
community.  
 
Nigeria had suffered some image problems 
in the immediate past. These had included 
the Britain-Nigeria misunderstanding over 
the Umaru Dikko kidnap affair (Fawole, 
1999), the Billy Eko and Gloria Okon drug 
peddling scandals to which erstwhile 
President Ibrahim Babangida was linked, 
corruption and advanced fee fraud (419) and 
Babangida’s endless transition programme 
(Akinterinwa, 2001). However the gross 
human rights abuse, ridiculous transition to 
civil rule program under General Abacha 
and many instances of diplomatic failures in 
management of the image problem fuelled 
  15 
Covenant Journal of Politics and International Affairs (CUJPIA) Vol. 1, No. 1 (Maiden Edition), September, 2013 
 
the collective western condemnation and 
accentuated the resolve to dismantle the 
military fortress in Nigeria’s political 
capital. The highpoint of the regime’s 
blunders was the negligence of global plea 
for clemency in the death sentence passed 
on the Ogoni environmental rights leaders, 
their subsequent hanging and alleged 
sponsorship of assassinations of perceived 
political enemies (Saliu, 1996).  
 
The hostile domestic environment was 
expectedly going to drive the investors away 
and keep potential investors at a safe 
distance from Nigeria. Thus Abacha’s style 
created a policy conundrum that made him 
lose popularity both at home and abroad. In 
such circumstance brute force always is 
likely the state art of dictatorship and this 
was exactly the recourse of the Abacha 
regime (Mbang, 1997: 6).  
 
The immediate response of the international 
community to the execution of the Ogoni 
leaders strategy of the international 
community was to isolate Nigeria. The 
Canadian government closed its high 
commission in Nigeria, South Africa 
severed ties with Abacha’s government and 
the American and British authorities 
imposed full military and limited economic 
sanctions in order to frustrate and, in the 
process, compel the military government to 
change its unpopular style of administration.  
 
General Abdulsalami Abubakar contended 
with a most battered Nigerian international 
image, an isolated country and a messy 
foreign policy from 1998 on assumption of 
power after the sudden death of General 
Abacha. Abubakar’s quest to launder 
Nigeria’s image abroad and renounce the 
pariah status, made his administration to 
adopt a foreign policy of retreat. He 
changed the combative nature of the 
previous administration in the utilization of 
instruments of policy to attract foreign 
pardon and sympathy towards Nigeria. 
Some authorities in foreign policy, 
including Ojo and Azeez (2002:216-17) 
have argued that this was meant to 
reintegrate Nigeria in the comity of nations. 
The whole essence of reintegration 
strategies was to bring Nigeria back into the 
mainstream of the global capitalist economy 
after a long absence (Saliu, 1999: 236). 
Abdulsalami’s approach was however too 
pacifist and rather than restore Nigeria in 
the old uncompromising enviable position, 
it demeaned the country as Nigeria had 
always occupied a dignified position in 
global politics, not at all appearing beggarly.  
 
These are the compelling factors according 
relevance and import to this paper. It 
examines the reaction and retreat in the 
foreign policy of a nation that had a long-
range policy target to assume leadership 
position like the United States, in the world. 
The paper is thematically structured to take 
a full stock of the issues pivotal to the 
policy conundrum at the external level.  
 
 
Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis 
The foreign policy making and action of 
Abacha and Abdulsalami, like that of any 
other’s are matters of rational or irrational 
decisions and calculations, with the primary 
objective of maximizing gains or recording 
minimal losses in international politics 
(Ogwu and Olukoshi, 2002: 17-18). 
Rational decision making model captures 
the essence of the arguments in the paper 
and hence will be the binoculars to look at 
issues and scale to measure the decisions 
and actions of the state in the global system 
during our period.  
 
Decision-makers, out of a list of 
alternatives, calculate the cost and benefits 
of taking a certain course of action. They 
reach a decision by choosing the alternatives 
with the highest benefits and the lowest 
costs. The term ‘rationality’ relates to how 
decision-making entails purposeful, goal–
directed behaviour that is exhibited when 
the individual is responding to an 
international event using the best 
information available and chooses from 
pool of possible responses that are most 
likely to maximize his goals (Verba, 1969 as 
cited in Kegley & Wittkopf, 1989). 
Decision-makers tend to attach probabilities 
to the possible outcome of an action as a 
result of the uncertainties in terms of the 
cost and benefits of taking such action. 
However it is necessary to note that while 
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some decision-makers accept risks others 
are prone to averting risks.  
 
Rational decision-making is done through 
a sequence of steps: 
1. Problem recognition: This marks the 
beginning of the decision-making 
process. Decision-makers perceive 
the existence of a problem, which 
they must deal with based on the 
accuracy of the information 
available. Accuracy here means the 
information required for dealing 
with the problem must be readily 
available; information about the 
‘actions, motivations, and 
capabilities of other actors ’, the 
international system inclusive. 
(Kegley & Wittkopf, 1989: 38). 
2. Goal selection: Policy makers 
determine the rationale for resolving 
the problem. Hence, all identified 
goals are arranged in order of 
preference. 
3. Identification of alternatives: A list 
of alternatives (policy options) is 
made available with the calculated 
cost and benefit of choosing each 
policy option. 
4. Choice: Based on the cost-benefit 
analysis conducted for each policy 
option, the alternative that is, the 
policy option that addresses the 
problem is selected.  
 
According to Rosenau, 
         no framework has energized 
inquiry in foreign policy as 
Rostow’s theory of the   
economic growth did in the 
economic development field, as 
Festinger’s theory of cognitive 
dissonance did in social 
psychology or as Almond’s 
functional model did in 
comparative politics, as rational 
decision making (1980: 119) 
 
Like all theories, the rational decision-
making theory has its own shortcomings as 
well. The rational decision-making model is 
shrouded in uncertainties, ranging from the 
effect of events on the international scene 
on decision-making and multiple goals of 
decision-makers. Certain factors impinge on 
decision-makers’ capacity to make 
decisions, such as the fact that decisions are 
reached in a group context, that is 
agreement is required before a decision is 
arrived at. Problem definition because of 
lack of information is often delayed, while 
information that is available is often 
inaccurate. Goal selection on the other hand, 
poses some difficulty because of the 
ambiguities in defining what national 
interest is. At the choice phase, decision 
makers engage in what Herbert A. Simon 
(1982) refers to as ‘satisficing’ behaviour 
that involves, selecting the choice that meets 
minimally acceptable standards in place of 
optimal alternatives. 
 
Closely related to the above is the difference 
between theory and practice. The ideal 
process of rational decision making involves 
accurate and comprehensive information 
about the problem, clear identification of 
goals, analysis of options, choosing the most 
favorable alternative based on a rational 
decision criteria and an evaluation of the 
consequences of selecting the policy option 
followed by measure aimed at correcting 
errors. In actual practice however, 
information about the problem is often 
distorted, individual interests bias national 
interest, policy options available are limited, 
selection is done by political bargaining and 
compromise, superficial evaluation and 
delayed correction of errors (Kegley & 
Wittkopf, 1989: 38). 
 
 
Against the backdrop of the rational 
decision making model, the paper 
determines what points the Nigerian foreign 
policy  process was rational or irrational, 
particularly as major and crucial decisions 
were expected at critical junctures between 
1993 and 1998, and from then to now. The 
foreign policy terrain of Nigeria at the 
earlier points was delicate and intricately 
interesting, with critical moments at the 
domestic level capable of turning the 
international community against the 
country. It is pertinent to note that the 
situation at the time is a fundamental 
example of the important place of the 
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domestic environment in shaping a nation’s 
foreign policy. 
 
The Abacha years were the most irrational 
in foreign policy decision-making in the 
chequered history of Nigeria. The domestic 
environment of the foreign policy process 
was characterized by a ruthless manner of 
handling perceived and real opposition to 
the government, which attracted western 
and global concern, and Abacha’s prompt 
use of aggression to challenge what he 
considered undue external interference in 
the country. For the five years he ruled 
therefore, Nigeria’s foreign policy was 
essentially aggressive. 
 
The Abacha years were the most irrational 
in foreign policy decision-making in the 
chequered history of Nigeria. The domestic 
environment of the foreign policy process 
was characterized by a ruthless manner of 
handling perceived and real opposition to 
the government, which attracted western 
and global concern, and Abacha’s prompt 
use of aggression to challenge what he 
considered undue external interference in 
the country. For the five years he ruled 
therefore, Nigeria’s foreign policy was 
essentially aggressive. 
 
Abdusalami’s pacifist foreign policy, on the 
other hand, represented a descent of 
Nigeria’s glory that characterized the time. 
It was the highpoint of a weakened power 
that had also lost its goodwill and demanded 
a modicum of legitimacy in the comity of 
nations.  
 
Foreign Policy Decision-Making: The 
Person, the Process and Nigeria’s 
Pedigree 
As a pattern of behavior that one state 
adopts in relating with other states and as 
the strategy and tactics employed by the 
state in its relation with other states in the 
international system, foreign policy thus 
connotes for Ojo and Sesay (2002) a plan or 
programme of actions of a state, which 
determines the sum-total of the state’s 
objectives in the international system. In 
this sense, therefore, national interest deals 
with the state desires and the definition of 
the most effective means to go about it. 
 
In the process of making foreign policies, or 
at the stage of initiating policy objectives, 
certain factors are considered. These factors 
naturally condition the foreign policy of a 
state, and are standards that policy makers 
use to measure policy aims. Aside 
considering the factors, including leadership 
style, pattern and orientations; the 
geography is taken into consideration as 
well. All these variables, and external ones, 
including what is at stake for the country in 
relating with a state or more states, 
essentially determine the national interest. 
 
Also, policy makers assess prevailing 
interest within domestic society with a view 
to determining what constitutes national 
interest: providing national security, 
protecting national prestige, maintaining 
state integrity and promoting economic 
interest. In the conducting of foreign policy 
affairs, and the uses of foreign policy, Hans 
Morgenthau (1973), identifies the 
individual(s) who are behind such affairs, 
and calls them the power of the foreign 
policy of a nation. For him, the foreign 
policy of any nation is the foreign policy of 
certain individuals who belong to the same 
nation. Morgenthau echoes Marcel Proust 
who says: 
 
The life of nations merely repeats, 
on a larger scale, the lives of their 
component cells; and he who is 
incapable of understanding the 
mystery, the reactions, the law that 
determine the movement of the 
individual, never hopes to say 
anything worth listening to about  
the struggles of nations (Proust, 
1971).. 
The analysis by Morgenthau and Proust 
reinforces the fact that national interest, in 
most cases, is the product of individual’s 
personal ideas, ideologies and interest, and 
the success or failure of foreign policy is not 
usually a result of weakness of the nation, 
but more as a consequence of the far- or 
short-sightedness of the men behind the 
policy process. The foreign policy failure of 
Nigeria and its posture of a weakling under 
Abacha and Abdulsalami respectively were 
indeed the failures of them as a person.  
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What Morgenthau considers as elements of 
national power, such as advantage or 
disadvantage of geography, natural 
resources, industrial capacity, military 
preparedness, population size and 
resourcefulness, national character, national 
morale, quality of society, quality of 
diplomacy and quality of leadership of 
government; also constitute essential 
domestic determinants of foreign policy 
aims, efficacy, richness and consistency. 
Leadership matters most, because it is the 
institution that will identify the national 
potentials, harness them and make a balance 
between the resources and policy, and 
among the resources. For, as Morgenthau 
(1973) puts it, a government 
must choose the objectives and 
methods of its foreign policy in 
view of the power available to 
support them with a maximum 
chance of   success. A nation that 
sets its sights too low, foregoing 
foreign policies will within the 
reach of its power, abdicate its 
rightful role in the council of 
nations (Morgenthau,  1973). 
 
Thus, national power determines the limit of 
foreign policy. But there is an exception to 
the rule, and that is when the very existence 
of the nation is at stake. Then, Morgenthau 
posits, “the policy of national survival 
overrides the rational considerations of 
national power”. 
 
What this implies is that foreign policy may 
not necessarily mind the pulse of the 
masses. Alexis de Tocqueville (1945) in On 
American Democracy where he narrated 
how George Washington’s policy of 
declaring war against England in 1776 was 
reprobated by the majority in America but 
still went ahead with it , posits that popular 
support or opposition may not necessarily 
count in the execution of foreign policy. The 
statesman must think in terms of national 
interest, conceived as powers among 
nations. Government must resist the 
temptation to sacrifice what it considers 
good policy upon the altar of public opinion. 
The government is the leader of the public 
opinions and is therefore not expected to be 
goaded and misled by the whimsical 
opinions of the masses in matters of foreign 
policy. 
 
Foreign policy, like any other policy, is 
beset with the lacuna of social theory in 
political practice. According to Brain Fay 
(1996) policies are not always executed the 
way they are set out, there is a missing link 
between a positivist theory of social 
knowledge and a social engineering 
conception of political practice. He 
therefore advocates what he calls policy 
science in policy process to achieve the best 
result. He describes policy science as “that 
set of procedures which enables one to 
determine the technically best course of 
action to adopt in order to implement a 
decision or achieve a goal.” 
 
 
The ‘policy engineer’ in the context above 
is one who seeks the most technically 
correct answer to political problems in terms 
of available social scientific knowledge. In 
terms of foreign policy, the engineers are in 
most cases, the head of state, foreign affairs 
secretary or minister as the case may be, and 
personnel at the foreign ministry, members 
of the National Assembly, diplomats and 
diplomatic missions, ambassadors and 
representatives of a nation at sub-regional 
and global organizations. 
 
Foreign policy is used in many ways. It is 
generally a tool for a nation to relate with its 
contemporaries in the international system 
of states. It is used in such a way that a 
nation will benefit from the system, a fact 
that national interest dictates the nature and 
aims of foreign policy. Foreign policy is a 
strategy by a nation to maximize profits and 
record minimum losses in the global system 
(Nwolise, 1993). While a country’s foreign 
policy should be in tandem with the general 
principles governing international relations, 
including international law, international 
morality, etc., it still essentially remains an 
instrument of international muscle-flexing 
in most cases. The foreign policies of Great 
Britain, France and Germany for instance, 
remained, for a long time, those utilized for 
establishing political, economic and cultural 
hegemony over the rest of the globe. This 
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explains their expansionist policy of 
colonialism ab initio. 
 
Some foreign policies, on the other hand 
have been servile ones, which have either 
been parasitic, lacking in ideological focus 
and dependent on the ex-metropoles. 
Conversely, dynamic Third World foreign 
policies have tended to establish the 
economic independence of their countries in 
the international system of unequal socio-
political and economic relations. Countries 
with aggressive foreign policy objectives, 
history has shown, use their foreign policies 
to enhance their economic development and 
better the lot of their citizens. As a strategy, 
Mercado (1995:107-27) notes,   
Patriotic leaders practically apply 
the foreign policies of their 
nations strategically to   pursue 
the economic development of 
their states as a priority objective 
of the of foreign policy. In this 
way, they progressively 
transform their technology, 
environment, industry and, 
advance their people’s living 
standard (Mercad.o, 1995). 
 
An undynamic and unfocussed foreign 
policy will bring a nation to its knees in the 
face of pressures from economic predators. 
For instance, when Nigeria sought Western 
technocrats during the civil war, it became 
tied to their aprons: Britain enjoying 31%, 
West Germany 30%, and the Netherlands 
13% of its exports in raw materials, 
including crude, while these countries 
supplied it with 70 of it imports, all in cheap 
finished products (Nwolise, and Akpotor, 
1999). 
 
Nigeria’s foreign policy, for several 
decades, has been fantastic on paper, but 
when critically reflected on, is vague, 
nebulous and outlandish. The policy 
engineers have, particularly under military 
rule, been “father-Christmassy” and 
exhibited a lack of understanding of foreign 
policy substance, ideology and direction. 
From independence, Nigeria’s policy has 
been geared towards the pursuit of either 
political goals, international recognition as 
the giant of Africa, or attraction of foreign 
aid. No wonder, Ike Nwachukwu), former 
External Affairs Minister, said that 
Nigeria’s foreign policy 
                                 
       should reflect our changing national 
circumstances as well as adapt to the 
realities of a rapidly changing 
international environment …Indeed, 
considering Nigeria’s present 
circumstances, economic issues have 
acquired added significance and 
should in any view be given priority 
attention in our foreign 
policy(Nwachukwu, 1988). 
 
 
Nigeria’s use of foreign policy on the 
African scene is reminiscent of 
Morgenthau’s postulation that foreign 
policy is all about national power, power 
being the major tool in the struggle for the 
minds of men, the struggle which translates 
into foreign policy. For Nigeria, policy is 
the veritable instrument of swaggering its 
political power and political influence in 
Africa. Its policy earns less of military and 
economic power, but earns the country the 
image the military, economic and political 
giant of Africa. This makes it to have that 
‘father Christmas’ disposition towards any 
‘needy’ African nation. 
 
 
Like the French foreign policy was at a 
time, the promotion of foreign economic 
investment is glaringly absent in Nigeria’s 
policy, but there is the glorification of the 
pursuit of international status, prestige, 
grandeur and largely, especially under 
military rule, the preservation and 
maintenance of the regime in power 
(Otubanjo, et al, 1985)  
 
 
The uses of foreign policy thus falls within 
four broad categories namely: national self-
preservation, that is the pursuing of policies 
for the maintenance of existing values like 
national independence; territorial integrity 
of regime in power, etc; national self-
extension, that is, furthering policies aimed 
at achieving external values such as national 
economic development: and self-
abnegation, which connotes pursuit of 
policies meant to achieve international 
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peace and solidarity. For most of the period 
of its 40 years of existence, Nigeria falls 
within the first and the last categories. 
 
While changes in course and character have 
occurred till date, the standard principle of 
Nigeria’s foreign policy has however 
remained the same. They are the principles 
of dignity of states, non-interference in the 
local affairs of other states, self 
determination of peoples under any form of 
colonial or racist rule, good neighborliness 
with other countries and a drive towards 
African unity (Adeniran, 1989:31-34; 
Okolo, 1989). 
 
 
In the evolution of the Nigerian post-
colonial foreign policy, the Tafawa Balewa 
administration exercised greater hesitancy 
and uncertainty regarding international 
issues and tended to be pro-West. Being a 
member of the Monrovia Group, which 
advocated a cautious, gradual and pragmatic 
approach to African unity, Nigeria’s foreign 
policy tended to lack the kind of dynamism 
expected of that time, as it even went ahead 
to sign a defense pact with Britain in 1962. 
However, the Balewa government still made 
strides, prevailing on the Commonwealth to 
expel apartheid South Africa, and breaking 
ties with France for its nuclear test in 
Western Sahara. Nigeria also joined the 
Non-Aligned Movement in the heat of the 
Cold War, in order not to take sides with 
any of the two conflicting ideological blocs 
namely, the Capitalist West and the 
Socialist East (Aluko, 1981) 
 
Gowon’s foreign policy was conditioned by 
the civil war of 1967-70. The discovery of 
oil brought Nigeria to greater international 
limelight. Nigeria placed much emphasis on 
Africa as evident in the emergence of 
regional and bilateral bodies as the 
ECOWAS, Chad Basin Commission and 
Niger Basin Commission. It also recognized 
the state of China despite the Western 
opposition and from the civil war began to 
maintain a balanced relationship with the 
Western and Soviet blocs, and exhibited 
concern for Africans in the Diaspora. 
 
Murtala-Obasanjo’s era witnessed a more 
dynamic foreign policy. It nationalized the 
British Petroleum (BP) for the purposes of 
compelling the British in Rhodesia to accept 
negotiation with liberation movements there 
and make them set the path for Zimbabwe’s 
quick independence. Nigeria also 
recognized the MPLA as the legitimate 
government of Angola, against America’s 
President Ford’s persuasion that African 
leaders should disregard the leftist 
government of the MPLA (Aluko, 1981; 
Fawole, 2000). 
 
Nigeria lost its reputation as a Frontline 
state fighting against apartheid in South 
Africa during the Shagari regime, and the 
Buhari-Idiagbon era ushered in an 
aggressive anti-drug and anti-corruption 
policy to brighten the country’s foreign 
policy and image prospects. 
 
By and large, Nigeria’s foreign policy 
principle remained the same, with the 
ultimate concern of transforming the 
country into a political giant relevant in an 
African peace and development. 
 
Abacha’s Policy Conundrum 
In June 1993 Nigeria’s military, led by 
General Ibrahim Babangida, annulled 
election results, thereby blocking the 
inauguration of the country’s first civilian 
president in a decade. International 
observers had declared that the election of 
Moshood Abiola was “free and fair” and the 
U.S. Congress had passed a resolution 
recognizing its legitimacy. In prodemocracy 
protests that ensued several hundred 
demonstrators were killed. The military 
coup  of November 1993 and repression 
angered the U.S. (along with the rest of the 
world), which viewed Nigeria as both a 
reliable political ally and an economic 
powerhouse in Africa. The crisis confirmed 
widespread suspicion that Nigeria’s military 
elite was unwilling to relinquish power to a 
democratically elected civilian government. 
The Clinton administration quickly 
condemned the Nigerian military’s action 
and proposed limited diplomatic and 
economic sanctions. By the time General 
Abacha seized power in November 1993, 
Washington had canceled the visas of 
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important military personnel, restricted arms 
sales, halted all U.S. economic and military 
aid, and cut off Nigeria’s access to trade 
credits and guarantees (Fadope, 1997). 
Abacha had shot himself to power on the 
heels of the illegitimacy of the Interim 
National Government,
 
headed by Earnest 
Shonekan. That council was generally 
regarded as illegitimate, weak, slow and 
incapable of arresting the socio-economic 
and political crisis of his time (Eragbe, 
1997). Pro-democracy activists had gone to 
court to seek an injunction declaring the 
administration illegal and unfit a premise 
subsequently for the intervention of General 
Abacha on November 17, 1993 (Obi, 1997).      
 
 
Despite the initial sanctions and diplomatic 
face-off with the U.S. and international 
community designed to persuade the 
Abacha regime to return to the democratic 
process, political and human rights steadily 
deteriorated. General Abacha ruled by 
military decrees and effectively neutralized 
all political opposition. Abiola was arrested, 
thousands of labor leaders, prodemocracy 
and human rights activists, and other 
opponents were jailed, and many others, 
including protesters were killed. The state 
secret terror squad, Abacha’s Strike Force 
led by Barnabas Msheila assassinated the 
ruler’s perceived and real political enemies 
in the ever growing camp of the pro-
democracy activists (Fadope, 1997). 
 
Abacha had disbanded all democratic 
institutions, including the electoral body and 
the National and State Houses of Assembly, 
and sacked all the federal and state cabinets. 
While he ignored the June 12 issue which 
had attracted the military sanctions from the 
West, a new democratic agenda or 
transitional programme was not even put up, 
except nebulous statements on a planned 
new transition, which would be centered on 
the outcome of a proposed constitutional 
conference. 
 
Abacha’s broadcast on November 17 met 
resentment of the local and international 
publics. Violence in the cities of Ibadan and 
Lagos, and other major towns prompted 
London and Western financial institutions to 
begin to reconsider its relationship with the 
Nigerian military government. According to 
them, only the quick return of Nigeria to 
democracy could elicit a smooth 
relationship with the country once again. 
The junta made a volte-face, and sought 
how to realign with another part of the 
international community in the course of 
overcoming the opposition from pro-
democracy groups (Lovgren, 1998). 
 
However, Nigerians and the world were no 
longer sure Abacha wanted Nigeria returned 
to democracy. Abacha was not upholding 
his commitment to change Nigeria's 
government from a military regime to a 
democracy by 1998. Abacha's failure to 
meet the deadlines of his first three-year 
reform program demonstrated that the 
government was not capable of making the 
transition on time. Abacha's exclusion of all 
political parties and individuals that did not 
support him as the future president showed 
that the regime was not committed to 
democracy (Onadipe, 1997).  
 
The restlessness of the world, particularly 
the U.S. over happenings in Nigeria was not 
far from the prognosis; there was a mix of 
political, economic and moral factors. 
Nigeria, Africa’s largest and most populous 
country (more than 140 million), is one of 
the U.S.’s largest trading partners in Africa 
and the world’s ninth largest oil producer. 
When Nigeria became independent from 
Britain in 1960, its size, natural resource 
wealth, and well-educated leadership 
positioned it as a regional power in West 
Africa. As a member of the Non-Aligned 
Movement, Nigeria never officially sided 
with the U.S., but its foreign policies and 
UN votes did not contradict American 
interests. The U.S. welcomed Nigeria’s 
political moderation, encouraged its 
regional prowess, and tolerated a string of 
military governments, punctuated by brief 
intervals of civilian rule. Together with 
Britain, U.S. military assistance and arms 
sales helped equip Nigeria’s army, the 
largest in Africa. Except for the Biafran 
civil war (1967-70), Nigeria had been 
relatively stable and it was just proper for 
the U.S. to secure its biggest trading partner 
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in Africa from possible disintegration. 
Despite tough words and some concrete 
diplomatic and economic measures, the 
Clinton administration and Congress refused 
imposing oil sanctions, the one move that 
could quickly force the military dictatorship 
to capitulate. The U.S. had continued to 
purchase over a half million barrels of 
Nigerian oil a day. This equals 8% of total 
U.S. oil imports—just under what the U.S. 
buys from the entire Middle East. Oil kept 
the military in power: 90% of Nigeria’s 
foreign revenues come from oil exports. The 
U.S. buys 44% of Nigeria’s oil and four 
U.S. oil companies are drilling in Nigeria 
(Fadope, 1997). This was an instance of the 
burden strategic and economic interests 
impose on U.S. quest to effective response 
to military dictatorships and human rights 
abuses in Africa (Obiozor, 1994). 
 
The international community pressurized 
the junta to free Abiola conduct fresh 
elections in which he would be free to 
recontest. Abacha’s failure to heed all 
entreaties caused the violent protest at the 
end of 1995 through 1998. The protests 
were nationwide, but were more multiple in 
the South-West, namely Ibadan, Lagos, 
Benin, Ilorin and Abeokuta. Political 
activists, anti-Abacha politicians, 
uncompromising student leaders, women 
leaders, journalists, etc, were arrested and 
detained.  
 
It was the very act of killing the Ogoni 9 
that became the junta’s Achilles’ heels. 
According to Emeka Anyaoku, 
Commonwealth Secretary General during 
that time, 
                       
          Things came to a head with the 
execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and 
his other eight Ogoni kinsmen in 
November 1995, an action that put 
the regime frontally at odds with 
the rest of the world, particularly 
the United Nations, the European 
Union and the Commonwealth. 
The Commonwealth in particular 
had to outright suspend Nigeria 
from its membership because it 
considered all of Abacha‘s conduct 
a gross violation of its 1991 Harare 
Declaration of Commonwealth 
Principles (Josiah, 2008). 
 
Also, Canada, a leading nation that led the 
movement against the hanging of the Ogoni 
9, took the first major step of freezing 
relations with Nigeria. It closed its 
diplomatic mission in Lagos and recalled its 
staff, while the US imposed more military 
sanctions on the country, threatened to 
declare top military and junta personnel 
persona non grata in US, and went ahead to 
cancel direct flights between New York and 
Lagos. Britain, leading a group of 
Commonwealth powers including South 
Africa, limited diplomatic relations with 
Nigeria (Meier, 2002). 
 
By the indefinite suspension of the 
Commonwealth of Nations and other 
diplomatic moves made to isolate Abacha 
the country suffered severe economic 
downturn. Aside its oil, other sources of 
revenue were blocked. Technology in-flow 
and products from the west were brought in 
with much effort, which led to the sliding of 
the naira value in the world market. 
Petroleum products thus became scarce and 
expensive as trade and commerce within the 
global economy had become impaired. Save 
for France with with which General Sani 
Abacha enjoyed economic relationship 
(Olarewaju, 1999:50-120), the Nigerian 
economy nearly lost touch with the western 
market. 
 
Its pariah status notwithstanding, the 
military administration as it would later 
show sponsored state violence secretly, 
assassinating the active crop of the nation’s 
democrats. In a desperate bid to acquire 
some false legitimacy a lot of money was 
spent on pro-Abacha rallies. The only five 
registered political parties also all held their 
national convention at which, they, one after 
the other adopted General Abacha as their 
consensus presidential candidate. 
Completely disillusioned with the political 
development in Nigeria, European nations 
mounted economic pressure on the country, 
imposing more sanctions and in some cases, 
severing diplomatic relations with it (Meier, 
2002). 
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Abacha’s administration carried on the job 
of foreign policy in a most pedestrian 
manner. While the intrigues at home and his 
international problems made him to lose 
foreign policy direction and misdirect the 
country’ policy objective, Abacha’s idea of 
foreign policy, it seemed was to earn more 
enemies for Nigeria. Nigeria was 
embarrassed several times by this approach, 
which by all means was ‘area boy’ 
diplomacy, as Fawole (2004) and some 
other scholars have noted. Abacha 
challenged the world to mind its business by 
asking them that Nigeria’s problems at the 
time were entirely Nigerian affairs, which 
should not concern the international 
community. Hence, Nigeria’s foreign policy 
objective rather attracted bitter resentment 
from overseas and generated greater unease 
and disaffection at home. 
 
However, Nigeria under Abacha fared well 
in its in its peacekeeping efforts in Liberia 
and Sierra Leone. The ECOWAS Peace 
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) got 
Nigeria’s maximum support to end the civil 
wars in those countries. An achievement for 
General Abacha was that Nigeria was able 
to use ECOMOG to end the wars in Liberia 
and supervise an election in which Charles 
Taylor, former rebel leader, emerged as 
Liberia’s President (Mazrui, 2006). 
 
The alleged coups of 1995 and 1997 in 
which prominent Nigerians, including 
General Olusegun Obasanjo, Shehu Musa 
Yar-Adua and Abacha’s deputy, General 
Oladipo Diya were indicted and 
consequently jailed attracted more 
international condemnation and isolation for 
Nigeria. The general feeling was that the 
two coups were arranged to frame and 
eliminate Abacha’s perceived obstacles to 
his presidential bid. The death in prison of 
General Yar’Adua in 1997 further caused 
more global disaffection towards Nigeria 
and its elimination from the group of 
dignified world nations (Olarewaju, 1999). 
 
Abdusalami’s Foreign Policy: Change or 
Continuity? 
Abubakar’s regime was a very short one. 
During both the Abacha and Abubakar eras, 
Nigeria's main decision-making organ was 
the exclusively military Provisional Ruling 
Council (PRC) which governed by decree. 
The PRC oversaw the 32-member federal 
executive council composed of civilians and 
military officers. Pending the promulgation 
of the constitution written by the 
Constitutional Conference in 1995, the 
government observed some provisions of 
the 1979 and 1989 constitutions. Neither 
Abacha nor Abubakar lifted the decree 
suspending the 1979 constitution, and the 
1989 constitution was not implemented. The 
judiciary's authority and independence was 
significantly impaired during the Abacha 
era by the military regime's arrogation of 
judicial power and prohibition of court 
review of its action. The court system 
continued to be hampered by corruption and 
lack of resources after Abacha's death. In an 
attempt to alleviate such problems, 
Abubakar's government implemented a civil 
service pay raise and other reforms (US 
State Dept, 2008).  
 
In August 1998, the Abubakar government 
appointed the Independent National 
Electoral Commission (INEC) to conduct 
elections for local government councils, 
state legislatures and governors, the 
National Assembly, and president. INEC 
held a series of four successive elections 
between December 1998 and February 1999 
(US Dept. of State, 2008).                .   
The PRC promulgated a new constitution, 
based largely on the suspended 1979 
constitution, before the May 29, 1999 
inauguration of the new civilian president. 
The constitution included provisions for a 
bicameral legislature, the National 
Assembly, consisting of a 360-member 
House of Representatives and a 109-
member Senate. The executive branch and 
the office of president retained strong 
federal powers. The legislature and 
judiciary, having suffered years of neglect, 
are finally rebuilding as institutions and 
beginning to exercise their constitutional 
roles in the balance of power (Ameh, 2008).  
 
In terms of foreign policy and Nigeria’s 
external relations, General Abdusalami 
Abubakar met a declining power and image 
of Nigeria, engendered by a combative 
  24 
Covenant Journal of Politics and International Affairs (CUJPIA) Vol. 1, No. 1 (Maiden Edition), September, 2013 
 
foreign policy of Abacha. The regime had, 
by this time, isolated itself from and had 
been further ostracized by the international 
community. Hence, the first task of General 
Abubakar was to overhaul the foreign 
ministry and set out a new policy agenda 
that would carry Nigeria out of its 
dwindling international fortunes. Abubakar 
confirmed this in his Budget of Realism in 
1999, viz: 
         This administration will continue 
to pursue its policy of constructive 
engagement with other members 
of the international community. 
We are committed to ensuring that 
Nigeria takes its rightful place 
among the comity of nations 
based on the principles of mutual 
respect and protection of our 
national interest. We …hope the 
international community will 
continue to support Nigeria at this 
critical stage … not only in 
ensuring the successful 
implementation of our political 
transition but also our economic 
reform programs (Abdusalami, 
1999).  
 
Abubakar began the process of reintegrating 
Nigeria in the global system by going on 
trips to world’s leading democracies 
namely, USA, Britain, France and South 
Africa. He had visited South Africa earlier, 
and reached Cotonou and Lome for talks on 
bilateral relations. In the UK, Tony Blair 
and Abubakar reached agreements on the 
transition programme and economic reforms 
in Nigeria. Abubakar also met British 
industrialists and businessmen with whom 
he also struck new business deals for 
Nigeria. President Bill Clinton had 
discussions with the Nigerian government 
on issues of human rights, rule of law and 
the democratization process in Nigeria. 
France insisted that the repressive laws, 
particularly Decree 2 of 1984 be repealed 
and political detainees released (Taiwo, 
1998:18). 
 
During Abubakar’s tours of the UK, 
London-based international human rights 
groups impressed it on the British 
government to prevail on the Abubakar 
government to resolve the outstanding 
human rights issues in Nigeria. Peter 
Takiramibiodde, Malcolm Smart and Eno 
Usua asked that journalists, politicians and 
other democracy activists arrested and 
detained by the past Nigeria government be 
released. Another group lampooned Nigeria 
for not accepting the proposal for the 
convocation of Sovereign National 
Conference (SNC) or the forming of the 
Government of National Unity (Taiwo, 
1998:20). 
 
Abubakar’s major objectives for the sojourn 
were to convince the world that a genuine 
transition to civil rule was on course, and 
that a process of national reconciliation at 
home had commenced. His declaration that 
elections would start in December, 1998 
with the local government polls and 
terminate in February, 1999 with the 
National Assembly and Presidential 
elections were heart-warming to the 
international community. Addressing the 
53
rd
 session of the United nations General 
Assembly in New York, Abubakar declared, 
I do not intend to run for any 
office. I do not belong to any 
party. Every serving soldier is 
going to return to the barracks… 
Our people are determined to 
ensure that a sustainable 
democratic government is 
established in the country 
(Abubakar, 1999b).  
 
 
Aside the fact that it is an expensive 
venture, it is the kind of government that 
encourages an atmosphere of liberty or 
freedom and an auspicious clime for market 
economy to grow within a social space. 
Abubakar discussed Nigeria’s debt burden 
with the US, averring that a burdening 
economy should not be bequeathed unto a 
nascent democracy. President Clinton 
promised relief for Nigeria’s $28 billion 
debt, but reiterated that sanctions on Nigeria 
would remain until an elected president was 
sworn in. US sanctions included limiting 
military sales to Nigeria, restricting visas for 
Nigerian officials and banning of air links 
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between Nigeria and the US (Awowede, 
1998; Meier, 2000). 
 
Back home, the Nigerian government 
attempted reforms. Abubakar released some 
political detainees, including former head of 
state General Olusegun Obasanjo, Bola Ige, 
Olabiyi  Durojaiye, Beko Ransom-Kuti, 
Frank Kokori, President of Nigeria’s 
petroleum transporters’ union, Christie 
Anyanwu, a renown female journalist and 
Niran Malaolu, editor of the Diet 
newspapers. He also began probe into the 
alleged looting of the country’s treasury by 
the Abacha family, recovering in the first 
instance, a whooping $727 million and 
inviting former Abacha top aides for 
questioning (Taiwo, 1998). 
 
Again Abubakar freed himself from the 
process of party formation and electoral 
process. This paved way for a free and fair 
electoral process that boosted the country’s 
international image. He also recognized the 
multiplier effects of the shortage of 
petroleum products at the time and vowed to 
nip in the bud, the problems of fuel scarcity, 
unstable supply of electricity and 
communications services, with a view to 
reviving the economy (Taiwo, 1998: 20). 
 
But the economy was far from being 
revived, with the country’s foreign reserves 
even sliding from $7 billion to $3 billion, 
the prices of oil products soaring from #11 
per litre to #20 despite their recrudescent 
importation and scarcity, and the minimum 
wage crisis wreaking its own havoc on the 
economy. On the political scene, Abubakar 
did not release immediately the winner of 
the controversial June 12 1993 presidential 
election, M. K. O. Abiola and several other 
political detainees detained by the Abacha 
junta. Also controversially left unreleased 
were Abacha’s former loyalists who Abacha 
himself had framed in the coup of 1997. 
Abubakar’s political re-engineering did not 
also take into consideration the agitations 
for SNC and GNU (Oyinlola, 1998: 14). 
 
These fuelled resentment and doubts from 
social crusaders. Constitutional lawyer, 
Gani Fawehinmi expressed doubts in 
Abubakar’s transitional agenda, saying, 
“anybody who believes in the transition 
programme must have his head examined by 
a qualified and experienced psychiatrist.” 
Abubakar’s broadcast in July 1998 further 
indicated that his administration was not 
interested in the issues of equal citizenship, 
internal decolonization, true federalism and 
the GNU. The United Action for 
Democracy (UAD), posited Abubakar’s 
disposition was “arrogant and unrepentant” 
and a “brazen relegation of the popular 
demands of the people.” Abubakar’s 
assumed brazen relegation of the people was 
followed by the agitations from the South-
West for the creation of Oduduwa State, the 
establishment of Radio Biafra in the South-
east transmitting on 154.60 megahertz at 19 
metre band shortwave from Washington 
DC, USA and the emergence of the Odua 
Peoples Congress (OPC). There were also 
insinuations that the US and UK were 
secretly backing Abubakar not to make too 
many concessions and that even the death of 
Abiola was engineered by Western 
conspirators and their Nigerian government 
accomplices to end the June 12 crisis once 
and for all (Ojebisi:1998:15-16). 
 
 
The visits of UN’s Secretary-General, Kofi 
Anan and Commonwealth’s scribe Emeka 
Anyaoku, were exploited by the Abubakar 
government to earn international goodwill. 
Anan was allowed to meet Moshood Abiola. 
But the death of Abiola in July 1998, during 
the visit of the US Under-Secretary of 
Foreign Affairs. Thomas Pickering, few 
days after shook the world and further 
caused national crisis. 
 
 
But the junta’s transition received a major 
boost in 1999 when Abubakar released more 
detainees, including General Oladipo Diya 
and other alleged 1997 coup plotters. The 
release and smooth transition process 
prompted the home-coming of Nigeria’s 
prominent exiles, some of who came to 
participate in the electoral process. Also 
gratifying to the international community 
was the successful hosting of the World 
Youth Soccer Championship (Nigeria ’99) 
which further endeared the government to 
the world. The FIFA nod was in itself an 
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indication of vote of confidence on Nigeria 
once again and that meant it had been socio-
politically re-integrated in the world system. 
 
Abubakar’s government became popular for 
its economic and political reforms. 
America’s Secretary of State, Madeleine 
Albright (cited in Oladeinde, 2000:9) 
confirmed this in a remark on the attitude of 
Abubakar after they had met in Washington, 
                
          I had a chance to reiterate our 
great pleasure with the 
remarkable progress that he has 
made in a very short period of 
time in restoring Nigeria’s 
international standing… we 
have a great respect for the 
people of Nigeria and wish to be 
of assistance however we Can 
(Albright, in Oladeinde, 2000).      
 
General Abubakar (cited in Oladeinde, 
2000:9) declared why his administration 
took decisive steps in its domestic and 
foreign policies,      
My administration was acutely 
aware of the heavy, dark clouds 
in the air which were only but 
ominous and imminent prelude 
to potentially destructive storms 
that portended a mortal threat to 
the ship of the Nigerian nation. 
We knew we had a historic 
responsibility to get our 
bearings right and move very 
fast, to avoid ship wreck 
(Abdusalami, in Oladeinde, 
2000: 9). 
 
He further said his interactions with the 
superpowers were boosted by the countries’ 
willingness to open up with Nigeria once 
again in the interest of “their own countries 
as well as for Nigeria.” 
 
Nigeria’s Economic Diplomacy 
In the Budget of Realism of 1999, General 
Abubakar vowed to pursue an economic 
diplomacy that would “mobilize the support 
of the international community for Nigeria’s 
policy reform.” He also declared that 
Nigeria would faithfully operate its 
economy within the framework of the 
ECOWAS trade liberalization scheme so as 
to eliminate trade barriers, including taxes 
and levies, but which would not be to the 
detriment of the country’s manufactured 
goods. Due to “resource constraints,” 
Nigeria set aside 1.5 billion dollars for 
external servicing for 1999 as against 2 
billion dollars it used to gulp hitherto. The 
country’s foreign reserves having dropped 
from 9 billion dollars to 3 million dollars, 
the Nigerian government sought to appeal to 
international financial institutions to assist 
in reducing the country’s debts. 
Negotiations were opened up with the Paris 
Club, Bretton Woods and other creditors to 
seek debt reduction or relief. During his 
talks with the British authorities, US, France 
and other countries, Nigeria sought debt 
cancellation or at worst reduction. Debt 
conversion was also sought. This was a 
vehicle for debt reduction as it meant 
creditor-nations would have a leeway to 
invest in the country. Interestingly, embargo 
on external borrowing was also lifted. The 
embargo imposed in 1994 was on 
concessionary and project-tied loans and 
credits (Oladeinde, 2000:9).  
 
Expectedly, Nigeria’s aggressive drive for 
debt reduction and renewed external 
borrowing was a paradox that rubbed on the 
country’s economy. First was the sliding of 
the Naira in the exchange market and the 
attendant deregulation of the oil sector. 
Second, this resulted in cheap prices of 
Nigeria’s crude oil in the world market, 
which escalated shortage of foreign earnings 
and dwindling external reserves (Oyinlola, 
1998:14). Much funding had to go to into 
the oil sector as petroleum products were 
imported in large quantities, and 
earnings/revenue from that sector was all-
time low considering the huge expenditure 
and yet the losses in attempt to get debt 
reduction and more loans. 
 
Sino-Nigeria Economic Relations 
The Abubakar administration met a strong 
Sino-Nigeria ties. The belief by Abacha in a 
strong ties with China was boosted by his 
conviction that the only way for him to 
maintain a power balance and a political 
leverage in the international community, 
where he had lost so much goodwill was to 
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befriend an eastern Socialist power. Also, he 
needed military leverage characteristic of 
dictators to perpetuate his stronghold and 
suppress internal opposition. Since the west 
would not provide him with such, Abacha 
sought China’s assistance. It is noteworthy 
that China was at the time, also a country 
with a poor human rights record, its 
government using threat and coercion to 
foist a brutish rule on civil-society. It is 
pertinent to note that Abacha also made 
friends with traditional enemies of the west- 
Libya, Iraq, Sudan and Afghanistan. 
 
China was considered a veritable nation 
with which to do business. Contracts for 
roads and railways reconstruction were 
awarded to Chinese companies. Also, China 
sold arms and ammunition to Nigeria 
regularly. China was also given the contract 
to produce military trucks for Nigeria. For 
instance, the China National Heavy Duty 
Truck Corporation, in collaboration with 
Steyr, a trucks-manufacturing company in 
Bauchi, began the production of the famous 
1291 and 1491 truck modes. The Abacha 
administration had sent a military delegation 
headed by General Abubakar himself, then 
the Chief of Defense Staff to China on tour. 
Abubakar toured China’s military 
formations, units and institutions in Beijing, 
Nanjing and Shanghai and inspected 
military drills and demonstrations by the 
Chinese army for lessons for the Nigerian 
army. Sino-Nigeria defence agreements 
were reached between Abubakar’s team and 
Chinese Premier, Li Peng, Defence 
Minister, General Chi Haotian and 
liberation Army Chief, General Fu 
Quanyou. China was at the time, between 
Abacha’s last days and Abubakar’s 
emergence as the country’s ruler, infamous 
for fuelling tension in Asia. It assisted 
Pakistan, a country at diplomatic-military 
loggerheads with its immediate neighbor, 
India, in developing a nuclear reactor and a 
plutonium reprocessing facility. In May 
1998, India and Pakistan began a nuclear 
race as both carried out a number of tests to 
determine mutual capabilities (Tell, 
1998:21). 
 
The Abubakar administration did not cancel 
the contracts awarded to Chinese companies 
under Abacha, nor severe military links with 
it. Neither were the anomalies replete in the 
Nigeria-China relations addressed. Bank 
vaults of Abacha politicians and defense 
contractors allegedly in China and Hon 
Kong were for instance, not investigated 
(Tell, 1998: 22). 
 
 
The China Civil Engineering Construction 
Company (CCECC), an integral part of the 
Chinese government was, during the 
Abacha regime, given the contract to 
refurbish and overhaul the Nigerian 
railways. Ironically, back in China, its 
railway system was being overhauled by 
German and Japanese companies. The 
CCECC contract, misnomer as it seemed, 
went on under the Abubakar administration. 
To this extent, substandard railway 
equipment and facilities were imported from 
China and little surprise it was, that the 
Nigeria railway system remained moribund 
and non-functional for the better part of the 
Abubakar regime (Bukarambe, 2005). 
 
The Chinese government itself was 
unwilling to allow its ties with Nigeria go 
sour. It was ever anticipatory of matching 
the US in the lifting of Nigeria’s crude oil 
and so, did not cease in giving agro-
economic and educational aides to Nigeria 
in order to make the pre-Abubakar 
agreement continually relevant. Being a 
product of the Abacha regime itself, the 
Abubakar government kept upholding the 
content of the former relations (Chibundu, 
2000). 
 
It is therefore pertinent to submit that the 
Abubakar administration changed little in 
Nigeria’s low ranking in the world because 
of the low times of its foreign policy during 
the twilight of the Babangida regime and the 
reign of Abacha. Abdusalami sustained 
much of what his predecessor had 
engineered and his pacification abroad 
constituted a manifestation of the low times 
for Nigeria’s international standing. It was a 
marked departure from old when Nigeria 
stood tall in the globe.  
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Continuity in Foreign Policy Thrust 
Nigeria’s foreign policy thrust has, in theory 
and practice, remained pro-Africa. It also 
goes pari passu with its international 
relations objectives. Nigeria under Abacha 
and Abdulsalami was very active in joining 
multi-national military forces to defuse 
tension in conflict-ridden areas of Africa 
and the world. This was in continuation of 
the principles and fundamentals of Nigeria’s 
foreign policy. Nigeria had unilaterally 
quelled the southern Cameroon crisis and 
the Nigeria-Cameroon border conflicts of 
1960-61. The country also played a part in 
containing the Somalian crisis, the Middle 
East conflicts, and the crises in Eastern 
Europe of the 1990s. During the Babangida 
regime, Nigeria committed billions of 
dollars into the Liberian civil crisis. The 
formation of the ECOWAS monitoring 
group (ECOMOG) was Nigeria’s initiative 
and the peace-keeping force continued in 
the Abacha regime. Abacha bankrolled the 
ECOMOG ventures in Sierra Leone in the 
wake of a civil war there. General Abubakar 
committed human, material and financial 
resources into the Sierra Leone crisis more 
than the previous ECOMOG experiences in 
war-torn areas of the sub-region. Put 
together, Nigeria had committed over 
250,000 soldiers in peace-keeping 
operations since 1960, which is more than 
the entire size of its armed forces (Uwalaka, 
1999). 
 
General Abubakar (cited in Uwalaka,1999), 
represented by this wife at the Africa First 
Ladies Peace Mission meeting in Abuja on 
May 10, 1999, however gave reasons for his 
government’s commitment to international 
peace-keeping (including monitoring, 
observing, enforcement, etc). He lamented 
the spate of wars and conflicts in Africa, 
which had claimed millions of lives and 
property, and which had created a major 
refugee problem. Six million refugee and 18 
million displaced persons were at the time, 
all over Africa. He said, 
 
       Nearly 40 years after independence 
and the establishment of the OAU, 
it is time for Africa to take its 
destiny in its hands, it is time for us 
to take responsibility for our own 
mistakes and move vigorously to 
correct them (Abdusalami, in 
Uwalaka, 1999). 
 
Nigeria’s presence in Sierra Leone cost 3 
million dollars per day, which was four 
times Sierra Leone’s annual budget. A 
breakdown of the expenditure on soldiers 
showed that aside the numerous cases of 
‘ghost soldiers’ whose allowances went into 
officers’ pockets, the commanding officers 
opted to keep records of dead soldiers away 
from Abuja, so as to keep receiving the dead 
soldiers’ allowances on their behalf. In spite 
of the huge spending, Nigerian soldiers still 
suffered deprivations and hunger-induced 
deaths. This not only weakened the morale 
of new recruits for Sierra Leonean mission, 
but raised fears of mutiny in the Nigerian 
barracks. The Nigerian officials decided to 
cajole the volunteers that there were good 
allowances and insurance scheme sponsored 
by Britain, US and Canada for each soldier 
(Seminitari, 1999:26). 
 
The Abubakar government embarked on 
international trips soliciting money to 
maintain its ECOMOG contingent. Ignatius 
Olisemeka, the External Affairs Minister, 
got promises of $2 million worth of logistics 
support from the UK in the fund drive. Also 
a total of $13 million in contract was got as 
contributions from the US and UK in 1998 
for ECOMOG operations. The contracts 
were even awarded to a US company, PAE 
(Seminitari, 1996:26) 
 
 Nigeria’s foreign policy commitment to the 
civil war in Sierra Leone was a major pre-
occupation in its international relations. This 
is understandable in view of the fact that 
Nigeria was transiting into democracy and 
wanted other democratizing African 
countries along, particularly threatened 
democracies like Sierra Leone. The 
restoration of Tejan Kabba’s administration 
by Abacha notwithstanding, Abubakar’s 
military commitment was to guide and 
sustain that country’s restored democracy 
and rid Sierra Leone of the remnants of anti-
Kabbah rebels. It was argued at the 1999 
ECOWAS summit that it was pertinent to 
retain ECOMOG to forestall future military 
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interruptions or rebellion that might again 
lead to civil war in West Africa. ECOMOG 
was thus supposed to be a kind of West 
African high command or standing army. 
 
General Abubakar also played mediating 
role in the Congo Kinshasa crisis in which 
rebels opposed to President Laurent 
Kabila’s government continued to push into 
the capital with aerial bombardments of 
non-combatants communities. This is a role 
Abubakar still plays as the UN’s Special 
Envoy in Congo. 
 
Conclusion 
General Abubakar’s approach may have 
played Nigeria down as a honourable and 
respectable member of the international 
community, it however brought the world to 
understanding that the nation as a whole 
wanted to make progress in its relationship 
with others. The Abacha regime had caused 
much damage which would require a 
restarting from the beginning. The 
reconstruction process would imply ample 
humbling disposition by Nigeria to its 
counterparts in the global system. No 
wonder, General Abdusalami Abubakar 
routinely made pleas in the public to the 
world to “forgive and forget”. 
Abdulsalami’s approach may be reminiscent 
of Chamberlain’s weak and terse response 
in the face of German aggression, but it sure 
guaranteed Nigeria’s re-entry into global 
reckoning. Nigeria re-integrated in the 
world community and recognized again as 
the giant of Africa. Positive results were 
yielded as national powers such as the US, 
Britain, France, Germany, Canada, South 
Africa and Netherlands began to reopen 
their doors for Nigeria: its head of state, 
ministers, other top officials and citizens. 
The acceptance by FIFA to have Nigeria 
host the 1999 world youth football 
championship was indicative of the 
international recognition and 
acknowledgement of the transition process 
in the country, and the passing of vote of 
confidence on the progressive government. 
 
Canada, which had severed diplomatic ties 
with Nigeria during the Ogoni crisis, 
restored links when it sent a delegation to 
Nigeria to reopen diplomatic talks on how 
to normalize Canada–Nigeria relations. The 
visits of UN’s Kofi Anan, Commonwealth’s 
Emeka Anyaoku and US’ Thomas Pickering 
in quick successions in 1998 were a 
measure of Nigeria’s reintegration in the 
global community. 
 
Exiles returned shortly after all other 
“phantom” coup plotters and political 
detainees had been released. They included 
Wole Soyinka, Dan Suleiman, Bola Tinubu, 
Tokunbo Afikuyomi etc., just as the repeal 
of the obnoxious Decree 2 of 1984 got local 
and international appraisal. 
 
To what extent, however, was Nigeria’s 
image crisis remedied? The Abubakar 
administration was accused of gross 
mismanagement of public funds as his 
government was even accused of siphoning 
billions of petrodollars allegedly shared 
among his lieutenants. Oil lifting and 
licenses were also reportedly arbitrarily and 
fraudulently given to Abubakar’s loyalists 
just as jumbo contracts running into several 
millions of dollars were also awarded within 
a period of five months. Furthermore, 
choice-lands, properties and house 
allowances were allocated to past rulers and 
old loyalists just as insinuations arose that 
the Abacha loots recovered were shared 
among government functionaries 
(Awowede, 1998). 
 
Moreover, corruption still pervaded high 
places and Nigeria’s image problem 
exacerbated by the perpetration of advance 
fee fraud (419) by syndicates persisted 
under the dispensation. The Transparency 
International (TI),a global non- 
governmental organization ranked Nigeria 
as the second most corrupt nation in the 
world during this period. The Abubakar 
administration thus failed to use Nigeria’s 
foreign policy to launder Nigeria’s image 
well, like the Obasanjo administration is 
presently doing.     
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